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Resumen Abstract
A lo largo del siglo XX, la psicología académica parece 
separarse  en  dos  dominios  radicalmente  distintos  e 
irreconciliables. La psicología discursiva se centró en la 
gestión  de  significado  en  un  mundo  de  normas, 
mientras  la  neuropsicología  se  centró  en  la 
investigación del cerebro y de los procesos cognitivos. 
Estos  dos  dominios  pueden  reconciliarse  en  una 
ciencia  híbrida  que  las  reúna  en  una  síntesis  más 
potente,  logro que los psicólogos no han conseguido 
con anterioridad.
En este artículo, se entiende que la psicología híbrida 
depende de la intuición de que mientras que el cerebro 
puede  asimilarse  en  el  mundo  de  las  personas,  las 
personas  no  pueden  asimilarse  en  el  mundo  de  las 
estructuras celulares y los procesos moleculares.
El proyecto de crear una ciencia híbrida, en la que el 
símbolo  incorpore  la  capacidad  de  que  los  seres 
humanos sean sometidos  a un plan unificado  de los 
aspectos  orgánicos  de  los  miembros  de  la  especie 
homo sapiens, exige la disolución del problema mente-
cuerpo, de alguna manera dejando de lado como una 
ilusión, basada en una premisa errónea.
As  the  21st  Century  opened  the  controversial  and 
unstable discipline of `academic psychology’ seemed to 
separating  into  two  radically  distinct  and  perhaps 
irreconcilable domains. Discursive psychology focused 
on the management of  meaning in a world  of  norms 
while Neuropsychology focused on the investigation of 
brain and cognitive processes. These two domains can 
be  reconciled  in  a  hybrid  science  that  brings  them 
together into a synthesis more powerful than anything 
psychologists have achieved before.
In this paper means Hybrid psychology depends on the 
intuition that  while brains can be assimilated into  the 
world of persons, people cannot be assimilated into the 
world of cell structures and molecular processes. 
The project of setting up a hybrid science, in which the  
symbol using capacities of human beings are brought 
into  a  unified  scheme  with  the  organic  aspects  of  
members of the species homo sapiens,  demands the 
dissolution of the mind-body problem, somehow setting 
it  aside  as  an  illusion,  based  on  a  mistaken 
presupposition.
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Introduction
As the 21st Century opened the controversial and unstable discipline of "academic psychology" seemed to 
separating into two radically distinct and perhaps irreconcilable domains. Discursive psychology focused 
on the management of meaning in a world of norms while Neuropsychology focused on the investigation 
of brain processes loosely correlated with intuitively identified cognitive processes. These two domains 
1 This paper is a resume of the argument presented in Harré (2004).
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can be reconciled in a hybrid science that brings them together into a synthesis more powerful than 
anything psychologists have achieved before. 
The fundamental principle of discursive psychology is that the instruments of cognition are symbols. The 
languages of everyday life are the most important symbolic tools. Hybrid psychology depends on the 
intuition that while brains can be assimilated into the world of persons, as among the instruments people 
use for carrying out many of their projects, people cannot be assimilated into the world of cell structures 
and molecular processes.  To suppose that  they can be has been called the "mereological fallacy" – 
ascribing attributes of wholes to some of their parts. People think, brains, parts of people, do not. People 
drive cars, their hands and feet do not (Bennett & Hacker, 2007).
The Central Role of Language 
People use symbolic systems of various kinds as instruments for thought. However, many philosophers 
and psychologists have believed that thought exists independently of the symbolic forms in which it is 
clothed and by means of which it is expressed. Language, though of great importance, is not the only 
medium of cognition. Sometimes a cognitive act, such as deciding which dish to choose from the menu, is 
achieved  by  manipulating  symbols  of  other  kinds,  such  as  images and  mental  pictures.  Sometimes 
symbols have a material embodiment in compasses and maps. 
Discursive psychology is based on the principle that whatever media people use, for instance, sketching a 
map to convey so a visitor how to find one’s apartment, the symbolic object is intentional, that is has a 
conventional  meaning,  and  it  is  normative,  subject  to  standards  of  correctness.  The  visitor  must 
understand the sketch not just as a pattern of lines on paper, but as a representation of the neighboring 
terrain, with the presumption shared by host and visitor alike, that the sketch is within the demands of the 
task, accurate..
Language as the Medium of Public Expression of Private Experience
If we are to be able to make a study of public language use as a method for investigating psychological 
phenomena, some of which are private, then we must have a suitable account of the relation of the public 
activities of speaking and other symbolic acts to the private activities and states they express. The notion 
of "expression" that will serve as the basis of that account, restoring the role in had in nineteenth century 
psychology  (Danziger,  1990).  I  will  show  how  a  simple  extension  of  Wittgenstein's  famous  Private 
Language Argument opens the way to a general  distinction between using language to describe our 
private experience and using it  to express that experience.  This distinction will  serve to give general 
support to the discursive method for exploring both private and public cognitive acts. 
Language use is not only public, as in conversation, producing an interpersonal realm of meanings. but 
there is also a private realm of human experience, and private uses of symbolic systems that play a key 
part in its production. How are the features of that world to be studied by psychologists and philosophers? 
To understand the views of discursive psychologists on this issue we need to draw on another important 
distinction that plays a major role in the psychological aspects of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. This is 
the distinction between expression and description.
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The distinction is an important ingredient in the famous Private Language Argument (Wittgenstein, 1953, 
pp. 240-315) in the course of which several points of importance are established. The general question 
Wittgenstein is discussing is whether a language could exist if meaning was established solely by pointing 
to exemplars, drawing the attention of the learner to examples of what a word is used to refer to. This idea 
seems reasonable when the meaning of words for large public objects like palaces or elephants are being 
taught. But could it work if the exemplars were strictly private somethings, such as private feelings? If 
words could be learned by pointing to such feelings then a strictly private language would be possible. But 
if the exemplars are strictly private they could not be used to teach anyone else the use of the relevant 
words, or even to serve as stable basis for the speaker's own practice. How do we learn them, if we 
cannot learn them by pointing to public examples? 
The process of developing a vocabulary for private feelings, begins, he suggests with natural expressions 
of pain, joy, and so on. As a child develops it learns to substitute vocalisations and finally verbal formulae, 
that function in the same way as the natural expressions they displace. The words "I'm so happy" express 
my happiness rather than describe my private feelings. Of course when I say such a thing I do have 
private  feelings  to  express.  But  the  relation  between  the  verbal  act  and  the  feeling  is  not  that  of 
description to object described. If it were a case of description the words and the objects they describe 
would have been independent of one another. But if my words express my feelings, just as laughing and 
singing might,  then,  ceteris paribus,  they are part of  a whole,  a complex of feelings and behavioural 
tendencies no part of which could be left out of what it is to be happy.
The domain of psychology
People are actively producing streams of thought and action, both public and private, embedded in a flux 
of bodily feeling. We routinely and unthinkingly partition this stream in all sorts of ways. We express  a 
belief,  we  claim  have  a memory,  we  make  a decision,  we  have  a temper  tantrum  and  so  on. 
Psychologists cannot but make use of these everyday partitions, for they define the subject matter of their 
studies. If we could not tell a temper tantrum from a memory claim there would be no psychology, indeed 
no human life at all as we know it. This picture is filled out by the idea that we should think of our lives as 
narratives, lived and told stories shaping what we do. The metaphor of life as narrative is one the most 
important  organizing  concepts  of  the  discursive  turn  for  many  new-wave  psychologists,  for  instance 
Jerome Bruner (1986), the Loughborough school (Edwards and Potter, 1992) and so on. From this point 
of  view perception  is  also  a  kind  of  action,  something  that  a  person  does  rather  than  the  result  of 
passively receiving visual, auditory, tactile and so on stimuli. We perceive by exploring the flux of visual, 
auditory, tactile and so on sensations, as the perceptual system seeks invariants, the shadows cast by 
material things and processes (Gibson, 1966).
The Act-Action Distinction
Can we find a general principle by means of which the stream of human activity should be partitioned in 
the most psychologically illuminating way? It seems natural to adopt the act/action distinction as a way of 
displaying one possible sequence of the elements of behaviour and thought, elements that are consonant 
with the root metaphors of meanings and rules for their correct use. Actions are what people produce 
intentionally. Acts are the meanings or forces of actions. A nod is an action, which, in the appropriate 
circumstances can mean that one agrees with what has been proposed. In other circumstances the very 
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same action can mean something else. Acts not only constitute narratives, but are constituted by the 
story-line that the narrative realizes. In the garden of Gethsemane a kiss is a betrayal. In greeting the 
Pope it is a mark of submission and respect. 
Having partitioned the stream of activity into a sequence of elements, relative to the story-line we are 
taking to be realized in the stream of activity, the question of how the elements are related must be taken 
up. Within the general framework of the root metaphors are various subsidiary concepts that are relevant 
to this problem. For example there are action patterns produced as the result of rule-following, as the 
result of living out a culturally specific story-line such as the "heroic quest", and so on.
In summary we can say that the idea of life as discourser involves the following main theses:
a. We produce both public and private streams of meaningful acts.
b. Some are conveyed verbally and some non-verbally, by gestures, postures, diagrams and so on. 
c. Public and private, verbal and non-verbal acts fall under the same general system of categories, both 
analytically and explanatorily.  Acts are the meanings of actions, determined in time and place by the 
identity of the actors and the nature of the context. 
Mind as Discourse
The choice of "discourse" as the leading metaphor for human thought and action is intimately related to 
the idea that the flow of intentional actions is the very "stuff of mind". Having a mind is to be master of 
certain  discursive practices,  for example,  remembering.  All  sorts  of  practices fall  under this  heading. 
Some are linguistic, some are not. All are intentional, that is all are meaningful, and all are subject to 
standards of correctness, propriety and so on. The sort of practice with which cognitive activities are 
being carried  on,  linguistic  or  non-linguistic,  will  determines  the choice  of  analytical  and explanatory 
models for the conduct of research.
According  to  the  "discursive"  point  of  view as  sketched  above,  psychology  is  primarily  the  study  of 
processes  -streams  of  human  actions  and  interactions-  which  can  be  understood  in  terms  of  their 
meanings for the actors and interactors and the norms and traditions that are generally accepted by the 
people involved and which shape their actions. Many of these streams of meaningful actions can be 
made sense as living out narratives, story-lines well known in the culture. Within this general scheme 
conversation is the most useful, but not the only model for analyzing such streams of action. Adopting this 
model  for  a  research  program  invites  the  researchers  to  treat  all  that  people  do  collectively  and 
individually, privately and publicly, as if it were a kind of conversation, that is consisted of meaningful 
exchanges constrained by a local system of rules and conventions. There are many different jobs that 
language can be used for.  We use words to give orders,  to make apologies,  to issue invitations,  to 
express our hopes and fears, as well as to describe and explain matters in our environments. 
How is it possible for a person to do all these things? Each human being must have acquired a body of 
knowledge,  appropriate  to  the  local  culture,  which  can  be  thought  of  a  resource  of  getting  the 
performance right. Rarely is this body of knowledge accessed consciously. Mostly it is immanent in the 
activities of the actors, as habits of mind and action. This is not a revival of behaviorism in an up-dated 
form --the content of a body of knowledge is made up of meanings and rules. Its function is normative!
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This leads directly to the study of what people must know and what skills they must possess to be able to 
produce the required actions. Complementary to each mode of collective action there must a repertoire of 
individual skills and dispositions. One of the most difficult questions faced by psychologists is what form 
this  knowledge takes.  Is  the common metaphor of  a "store  of  knowledge"  of  any value,  or  does its 
presupposition that items of knowledge are retained as knowledge, that is in propositional form, liable to 
lead us astray?
Continuing the "discourse" metaphor, we will find Wittgenstein’s concept of a "grammar" helpful. We have 
come across the term already, for the cluster of rules, implicit and explicit, which shape what we do, say 
and think in certain contexts. Sometimes a person is consciously following an instruction. This is one 
sense in which the word "rule" can be taken. It can also be used as a metaphor for cases in which a 
person or group of people act in an orderly way by habit, custom, convention and so on, in cases where 
there is no attention to explicit rules. Richard Shweder (1991) has identified a class of shaping principles 
that he calls "contingent universals". He finds such principles in the customs of cultures other than our 
own, and of course they could be found in ours too. These seem to be just the sort of principles that 
would be found in a Wittgensteinian grammar. Shweder illustrates the idea of "contingent universals" with 
some of the taken-for-granted conventions of for living one finds in a small  Indian town. It  would be 
unthinkable to eat  fish on the day of  one’s father’s funeral,  or to have one’s hair  cut  for two weeks 
thereafter.  People would no more dream of  calling these "rules" into question than we would on the 
principle that two distinct things cannot be in the same place at the same time. Of course, dear reader, 
you have already been thinking of the kinds of things that would violate this rule! Its is universal for some 
kinds of things, but not for others, just as the funeral customs of an Indian town are universal for some 
kinds of people, the Hindus who live there, and not for others, their Muslim neighbours. 
The final step in a psychological study of some cognitive procedure, say remembering or classifying, after 
the analysis of the streams of activity in which the procedure is carried on into elementary actions and 
acts, would be the proposal of a "grammar" or grammars expressing the norms that are evident in what 
people  are  doing.  There  are  both  tacit  and  explicit  grammars.  Michael  Polanyi  (1958)  and  Harold 
Garfinkel (1967) have pointed out that in order to use any explicit technique one must make use of a 
repertoire of tacit knowledge. When such knowledge is formulated explicitly the use of that knowledge as 
an explicit guide to thought and action will depend on yet another corpus of tacit knowledge. What was 
explicit in one context may be tacit in another. 
The grammars of everyday life
Contemporary Western life, conceived as discourse, seems to be shaped by three main grammars.
A Person or P-grammar, in which persons are the basic particulars and originating sources of activity. It 
comprises the rules for the use of the tribal dialects and idiolects of everyday life. Among some of the 
specialised dialects of this generic grammar are the idioms of the courtroom, Freudian psychotherapy, the 
Internet and so on.
A main feature of P-grammars is the way that responsibility is dealt with. This is particularly important for 
a  philosophy of  psychology,  since  the  transition  from infancy  to  maturity  of  a  being  that  has  native 
agentive powers and acts teleologically, occurs along the dimension of growing responsibility for what it 
does. Kelly Shaver (1985) has proposed an analysis of responsibility dimensions that will do very well as 
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a  working  grammar  for  much  of  the  P-grammar  of  current  English  language  folk  psychology2.  The 
attribution of responsibility according to Shaver runs as follows:
A judgement made about the moral accountability of a person of normal capacities, which usually but not 
always involves an agentive connection between the person being judged and some morally disapproved 
action or event (Shaver, 1985, p. 66)
Another  example  of  the  use  of  the  P-grammar  is  in  ordinary  cases  of  remembering.  Only  people 
remember, not brains. To say "I remember .. " is to claim some kind of authority, to commit myself to what 
I assert about the past. It involves my moral standing as a person. Playing tennis is another example. The 
exchange of shots is constrained by conventions of meaning: "On the line is out"; and of procedure: 
"Change ends after four games". Scores accrue to people and it is people who play shots, good and bad, 
for which they are responsible, and so on.
A Molecular  or M-grammar,  in  which molecules and molecular  clusters are the basic particulars  and 
originating  sources  of  activity.  Among  the  dialects  shaped by  M-grammar  is  human physiology  and 
molecular biology. Discourse framed in this grammar includes such attributions of agency to molecules as 
the power (alleged) of melatonin to put one to sleep, reflux of stomach acid is the cause heartburn.. There 
are many other examples of the influence of this grammar and its discourse of molecules and causes, for 
example eating a banana during a tennis match, using cortisone to reduce the inflammation in a cartilage, 
and so on. 
An Organism or O-grammar: Current Western discourses make use of a third grammar, that in which the 
basic powerful particulars are organisms. While it  has, so to say, its natural domain of application in 
discussions about animals it has some important uses in discourse about human beings. Animals are 
agentive and act teleologically, while molecules do not. Yet animals do not act intentionally in the full 
sense that would bring into play the grammar of responsibility except in rare cases. Responsibility talk 
addressed  to  family  pets  is  surely  metaphorical.  When  addressed  to  certain  primates,  such  as 
domesticated chimpanzees it may have a deeper significance, widening the scope of the domain of moral 
agents. We also use responsibility grammar for talking about, though not usually to, neonates. Babies act 
for an end but surely not for a purpose.
Not so long ago there was a fourth grammar in common use., the Spiritual or S-grammar. The basic 
categories recognized in this grammar, were God, the soul, sin, redemption and the like. This grammar, 
as an acceptable and unquestioned way of shaping one’s thoughts and actions, is now confined to certain 
rather restricted tribes and regions, for example the Mormon community in Utah. One notices, however, 
that the terminology is still in widespread used for rhetorical purposes, for example in the speeches of 
candidates for the United States Presidency. 
We have a loose cluster of grammars that set the standards of proper discourse for the human domain, 
the P, the O and the M grammars. Each has variants, and in certain circumstances they fit together into 
hierarchies, and, in other circumstances, they complement one another. 
These grammars include taxonomies,  classification systems for categorizing the sorts of  entities  that 
comprise their  domains.  A user  of  the P-grammar must  presuppose that  there are intended actions, 
classifiable into various types, that can be identified in the flow of human activity. The O-grammar user 
2 I owe notice of the Shaver dimensions to M. P. Spackman. 
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presupposes that there are bodily behaviors, also classifiable into types, and found amongst the behavior 
of pets and wild animals too. When someone uses the M-grammar to describe some aspect of their life, 
say a Chronic Fatigue Syndrome sufferer talks about organo-phosphates damaging the immune system, 
the  reality  of  molecular  exchanges in  organ  systems and  the  hierarchical  clustering  of  molecules  is 
presupposed. 
The three grammars must also include principles of sequence and order among basic and dependent 
particulars. In P-grammars these include semantic and syntactic rules and moral imperatives, which are 
used to shape sequences of meaningful actions. Thanks to the work of the ethologists we now see the 
lives of animals teleologically in terms of repertoires of actions directed towards maintaining their forms of 
life. This would be reflected in the O-grammar. In M-grammar sequences of chemical phenomena are 
understood as shaped by causal processes and described by causal laws. Only in the M-grammar do we 
have the means to provide causal explanations of the conventional sort, in which some prior state of the 
system brings about a present or future state.
Meta-discourse or "Human Sciences" 
Since scientific psychology is itself the product of the cognitive activities of human beings is must be 
applicable  to  itself.  Human sciences,  according  to  our  point  of  view,  must  include  discourses  about 
discourses. If the cognitive performances of ordinary life are shaped by implicit commitment to the P-, O- 
and M-grammars, these are the organizing principles of the folk psychology that ordinary people use to 
manage their lives. We could call these "primary discourses". What then of the grammars that shape the 
activities of psychologists researching the cognitive activities of ordinary people going about their ordinary 
daily business?
When we examine examples of psychological research we find that there are broadly speaking two sets 
of explanatory concepts in use. 
a. some phenomena are analyzed into cause-effect pairs.3
b. some phenomena are analyzed into rule governed sequences of meanings. 
A psychological problem is usually identified by the use of the concepts of meanings and rules, which 
control much of our ordinary vernacular, but subsequent research programmes tend to be couched in 
terms of  causal  concepts.  However,  since there are  no mental  causes and effects,  according to  the 
discursive point of view (they appear only as an illusion produced by using causal concepts to redescribe 
what  are  actually  discursive  phenomena),  these  concepts  are  appropriate  only  for  describing  and 
explaining events and processes in the material world, and should therefore be restricted to discourses 
using the O- and the M-grammars. By the same argument the use of concepts from the meanings and 
rules repertoire should be restricted to discourses using the P-grammar. Mosquitoes act purposively but 
not intentionally, and so do babies. Acids act causally but neither purposively nor intentionally. 
3 Fathali  M.  Moghaddam  (2006,  pág.  840)  has  used  the  phrases  "performance  capacity"  and 
"performance style" to make this distinction.
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If we are talking about meanings there is no place for causes, and if we are talking about molecules there 
is no place for reasons.
I believe that most of this secondary discourse is shaped by the same trio of grammars as shapes the 
primary discourse, namely P- , O- and M-grammars. Psychologies, in their historical and contemporary 
variety, are among the genres of this secondary discourse. Some favor the cluster of P-grammars (and so 
value  folk-psychological  explanations  and analyses),  others  favor  the O-grammar  and so  emphasize 
sociobiology and ethology,  which yet  others  favor  the M-grammar  and psycho-neurology,  looking for 
explanations of this or that feature of human life in terms of neurotransmitters and the like.
Seen thus  there  is  the  possibility  of  tertiary  discourse  genres,  shaped by  the  same  P-,  O-  and  M-
grammars, amongst these is the psychology of psychology. This is no fantasy. For example there is the 
study by Derek Edwards and Jonathan Potter (1992), in which they examine the psychological character 
of psychologists’ discourses about psychological phenomena, from a discursive point of view. 
An example of a tertiary discourse using both P-, O- and M-grammars would be some current discussions 
of the role of Freud in Freudian psychology, with his cocaine addiction (M) and his interest in antiquities 
(P). 
"Mind-body" Ties: Three Links between P, O and M 
discourses 
We are now in a position to deal with one of the most persistent problems in philosophy –the relation 
between mind and body. This has been seen to be a problem since we seem to be forced to admit the 
truth of two incompatible theses. Mental and material phenomena seem to be radically different in kind. 
For  example,  thoughts  are  weightless,  quite  free  of  the  power  of  gravity.  Limbs  are  locked  in  the 
gravitational field of the earth. Yet mental processes, such as deciding to throw a ball seem to lead to 
material processes, the hand and arm moving in such a way as to project the ball into something like the 
trajectory the thrower intends. Injuries to the body seem to be the cause of painful sensations. Molecules 
of acetyl-salicylic acid, aspirin, seem to be effective in eliminating the pain. And so on, through a huge 
catalogue of ways that the mental aspects of a person’s being are inter-related with the material aspects. 
Mental and material phenomena seem to be causally related to one another. If they are radically different 
in kind how could such causal relations possibly exist? In order for a relation to be causal. Not only must 
there  be  a  regularity  in  the  pattern  of  their  occurrence,  but  there  must  a  generative,  observed  or 
hypothesized, between the occurrence of the one and the occurrence of the other. But if there are only 
meanings and molecules in the universe the generative mechanisms would have to be either a sequence 
of meanings or a sequence of molecular transformations. The problem simply reappears when we think of 
how meanings and/or molecular happenings could be related to either kind of mechanism. 
The situation seems irresolvable. It is easy to see how philosophers of psychology could be driven to 
adopt one or other extreme solution denying the reality of the distinction between mental and material 
phenomena on which the existence of the problem depends. If there are only material phenomena there 
is no fundamental problem. If  there are only discursive phenomena there is no fundamental problem 
either.  However,  a  radical  materialism  nor  the  post-modern  reduction  of  everything  to  texts  are 
convincing. 
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Rethinking the Problem 
The project of setting up a hybrid science, in which the symbol using capacities of human beings are 
brought  into  a  unified  scheme with  the  organic  aspects  of  members  of  the  species homo  sapiens, 
demands the dissolution of the mind-body problem, somehow setting it aside as an illusion, based on a 
mistaken presupposition. The trick upon which the possibility of a unified cognitive science depends is to 
shift the focus from entities to discourses. We have already encountered the metaphor or leading idea 
with which the unification of the whole field of psychologically relevant discourses is to be accomplished, 
the metaphor of cognitive tasks and neural tools. It is not the only candidate for a unifying principle. In this 
section some other possibilities are examined, each having a role in the total project.
Having  shifted  focus  of  our  enquiries  from  the  misconceived  puzzle  about  how  two  wholly  disjoint 
substances could interact, and avoiding the complementary pitfall of the attempt to build a human science 
on the basis of one or other of these alleged substances exclusively, we can turn to examine ways in 
which the Person-based discourse, the Organism-based discourse and the Molecule-based discourse are 
related to one another.  It  seems to  me that  there are  at  least  three ways in which links are  in fact 
established between these ways of talking that currently dominate the discourses of the human form of 
life and its scientific investigation. There is the task-tool metaphor by which tasks defined in terms of the 
P-discourse are accomplished by tools described in terms of the O- and M-discourses. For example, the 
task may be to recall as accurately as possible the events of yesterday, a task for which such bodily 
organs as the hippocampus and the entorhinal cortex are the means. Then there is the way in which 
dispositions and powers defined in the P-discourse are grounded in structures, states and processes 
described in O- and M-discourse terms. Ability respond to the individuality of a face is grounded in the 
structure of the parvo-cerebral tract, linking the visual cortex with the frontal lobes. The third inter-relation 
appears in the way that classificatory systems applicable to the entities, states and processes describable 
in the O- and M-discourses are dependent on classifications of beings which are identified in the first 
instance as belonging to types defined in the P-discourse. For example, only if we can already identify an 
emotion such as anger, can we try to locate the regions in the limbic system that are activated when that 
emotion dominates someone's thought and feelings.
The task-tool link 
The idea that cognitive tasks often require the use of material tools introduces the metaphor of "brain-as-
tool". 
Consider first of all the way we human beings carry out certain cognitive tasks, such as adding up a bill. 
We are accustomed to think of a pocket calculator as a tool for doing sums. But since that gadget is a 
prosthetic  device,  accomplishing  cognitive  tasks  formerly  performed by  our  brains,  it  seems  entirely 
appropriate to apply the same concept to the brain, or a relevant region of it, when we are engaged in 
performing the cognitive task without using a prosthesis. A certain electronic device is a "calculator" only 
in relation to the task it is used to perform. Similarly a certain region of the brain is the organ of calculation 
only in relation to the task we use it to perform.
Material tasks also engage persons as agents. There too we make use of material tools. Some of these 
are  prostheses  for  other  body  parts  than  the  neurological.  For  digging  we  need  spades.  They  are 
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prostheses for hands, to which, in the absence of spades, we are obliged to have recourse, even now. 
Pieces of iron are "spades" only in relation to the task they are devised to perform. 
There are some tools which far outstrip their prosthetic ancestors, for both cognitive and material tasks. 
Bulldozers are spades of a sort, but of another order altogether when the task in hand is shifting earth. 
The same is true of computing machines when the task in hand is arithmetical or the reliable storage of 
vast amounts of data. 
Finally there are cognitive tasks for which we use cognitive or symbolic tools, for instance reasoning 
carried on with propositions. At this point the simple task (P-grammar) / tool (M-grammar) scheme seems 
to be in need of further development. To produce a statement, expressing a proposition, which is to serve 
as a tool in the task of solving a problem, is to engage in a task using a material tool, one's brain. Here we 
seem to have the use of a tool to produce a tool. This, too, is a metaphor with a familiar origin in industry. 
What advantages does the task/tool metaphor have over other ways of expressing the role of O- and M-
entities and states as enabling conditions for P-activities?4 People do not generally talk of their brains as 
tools. However, the point of introducing a metaphor is to extend the power of the existing language to 
cope with new insights and situations. Boundaries that seem to be impenetrable need to be examined. 
The metaphor of body parts as tools seems unproblematic in such a piece of advice "If you can’t find a 
trowel,  use your hand to scoop out a hole to plant the seedling". The idea of "tool and task" seems 
already to be fully formed in the common injunction to someone stuck in some problem: "Use your loaf!", 
meaning "Use your head [brains]". "Brain as a tool" is the scientifically innovative or creative concept that 
comes from the extensions of the "Use your ..." metaphor inviting us to look on our brains in a new way. 
Philosophical  justification  can  be  found  in  the  prosthesis  argument,  set  out  above.  Since  calculator, 
electronic organizer and even one’s pocket diary are tools for cognitive tasks, though there are cognitive 
skills  required to  use them,  we can also use our  brains as prostheses for  prostheses,  stand-ins for 
"extrinsic" cognitive tools, for example, by trying to remember the appointments recorded in a mislaid 
diary.  The  brain  or  one  of  its  modules  is  functionally  equivalent  to  something  which  it  is  not  at  all 
controversial to classify as a tool. 
Could we find a place for  the program of Artificial  Intelligence in the hybrid psychology I  have been 
describing? According to discursive psychology mentality is, for the most part, best construed as symbolic 
manipulations that are both intentional and normative. The models constructed by "knowledge engineers" 
are analogues of cognitive processes. Programs are written which, when run on a computing machine, 
lead  to  states of  the machine  that  can be construed  by a  human operator  as answers  to  cognitive 
problems. Successful projects of this kind can serve a double purpose in psychology. The programs can 
be  used  as  sources  of  hypotheses  about  the  formal  grammars  of  task  setting,  rule  accessing  and 
expressive  activities  generally.  This  application  develops  naturally  from  the  demands  of  devising  a 
program to simulate some human activity, an essential intermediate step being the writing a hypothetical 
set of rules, the following of which would lead to the required result, a state of the machine which can be 
read as "an answer" to a question expressed as an initial state of the machine. 
Successful  projects  in  AI  can also be recruited to  the project  of  cognitive  science,  as the source of 
schematic representations of the material properties of the tools used in discursively defined projects. 
4 My understanding of the task-tool metaphor was greatly advanced in discussions with Bennett Helm and John 
Deigh.
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Since many of these tools are material systems found at various levels in the brain, the AI models can, in 
some cases, serve as the source of important and perhaps testable hypotheses about brain architecture 
and brain functions. 
Dispositions, Powers, Skills and Capacities, and their Material Groundings
In colloquial English the word "disposition" is usually used to refer to a person's personality and personal 
style.  It  is  also sometimes used,  in phrases like "I  am disposed to let  you off  the penalty",  to mean 
something like "I am ready to ...". In philosophy of psychology the concept was used in a much more 
general way (Ryle, 1949). It was used as a catch-all term for all those properties which are displayed only 
under  certain  conditions:  "If  such  and  such  conditions  occur  then  such  and  such  behavior  will  be 
displayed". 
People have powers to act, they have skills for performing tasks properly, and they have capacities of 
various sorts. In each case the common feature of all these attributes, ascribable in discourses governed 
by the P-grammar, is the conditionality of the display the property so ascribed. So for every power, skill, 
capacity  and so on,  we can offer  a dispositional  formulation in  "if  ...  then ..."  terms,  to  express the 
conditional aspect of the attribute. 
This formulation capture only the minimal sense of these terms, since each has further implications. For 
instance the exercise of a person's powers are not just conditional on the coming to be of certain states of 
affairs, but the person is the active source of the behavior. "Jim has the power to jump that fence" implies 
that if Jim is minded he is able to jump the fence. But Jim must be so minded. If he jumps it is his act, and 
not the effect of some extrinsic cause.5 
Cognitive capacities, powers and skills are grounded in brain states, structures and processes. Here we 
have another way of binding the P-grammar to the O- and M-grammars. For example cognitive skills are 
described in terms derived from the P-grammar. It is persons who decide wisely, to up accounts correctly 
and so on. These skills are grounded in permanent neural states and patterns of dendrites in the brain. 
When brains are damaged cognitive skills are affected, even lost. 
Though it  is  an obvious truth  that  the brain  must  be  in  a  certain  state  for  cognitive  activities  to  be 
performed one has to be cautious in assuming that that is also a sufficient condition. All sorts of other 
conditions must be in place, such as the presence of other people in active conversational engagement 
with  the  thinker.  But  one  must  also be cautious in  how one interprets  the  many studies on loss  of 
cognitive skills by virtue of brain damage. One would think it would be obvious that because a certain 
psychological skill cannot be exercised if a certain part of the brain is damaged, that when the person is 
exercising the skill, that part of the brain is the module that is the tool in question. If the bike chain breaks 
the bike no longer provides transport,  but  a bike chain alone will  not  afford locomotion.  A moment’s 
reflection tells us that the lesion that stultifies the proper exercise of the skill may be just one aspect of the 
whole mechanism, and indeed perhaps a minor part at that.
The disposition-grounding link and the task-tool link are connected in that powers exercised in tasks are 
grounded in neuro-physiological mechanisms which are thereby the relevant tools, or parts the relevant 
tools.
5 Again see Moghaddam's distinction between capacity and style.
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The Taxonomic Priority Thesis
This thesis expresses in general terms the classificatory technique by which neural states, structures and 
processes are identified as relevant to cognitive processes. By the use of the Taxonomic Priority Thesis, 
the proper tools can be picked out from among all the available material things as just those relevant for 
the tasks in hand. The molecular bases of memory, for instance, can be identified only if they are picked 
out in relation to acts of remembering performed by the people whose brain states and processes are 
being investigated. Similarly we can only identify certain features of people’s brains as abnormalities if we 
have a way of identifying abnormal kinds of speech or conduct. Unless we could identify cases of people 
having word finding problems we could never identify a tangle of plaques as the relevant abnormality for 
Alzheimer's  Condition,  nor  damage  to  the  immune  system as  the  relevant  abnormality  for  Chronic 
Fatigue Syndrome. 
In  general  the  criteria  of  identity  for  states,  processes  and  structures  of  the  P-discourse  exercise 
"taxonomic  dominance"  over  the  criteria  of  identity  for  neural  states  and  processes  relevant  to 
psychology, that is for the M-discourse. Relevant neural states and processes are picked out by attention 
to the cognitive states and processes that are occurring. This the Taxonomic Priority Thesis. It has the 
effect of making the relation between mental states and processes and the relevant brain states and 
processes a necessary relation, that is it is conceptual not empirical. This is an important point that needs 
spelling  out.  If  the relation were empirical  each "side"  of  it  would  have to  be able  to  be picked out 
independently of the way the other is identified. Then research might reveal that there was a correlation 
between them. In  medicine there are plenty  of  examples of  this  kind of  discovery.  For  instance,  we 
identify coffee drinking according to certain criteria, and we identify Parkinson’s disease by another and 
different set of criteria. These sets of criteria have nothing to do each other. Research has established a 
very good correlation between coffee drinking and a low incidence of developing Parkinson’s disease. 
However if we use a PET scan to pick out the parts of the brain that are activated when someone is 
reading,  the  criteria  for  identifying  these  parts  include  the  criteria  for  knowing  whether  someone  is 
reading. It is a matter of logic that these are parts of the "reading machine". This way of picking things out 
has been called "top-down" classification.
There are ways in which such taxonomic relations, once established, are protected against disturbance. 
The most important has a central role in the establishment of empirical research projects in neuroscience. 
Here is how it works: suppose we do an experiment on a subject, say a PET scan, while the subject is 
performing some cognitive task, say calculating. The taxonomic priority thesis allows us to identify what is 
revealed in the PET scan as among the relevant neural processes for calculating. Imagine that we repeat 
the experiment on the same subject on another occasion and find a different neural process seemingly 
showing up in the PET scan. Do we abandon the thesis? No. We save it by the hypothesis that there is a 
so-far unobserved neural process in common to both occasions, and then we set about trying to find it. 
The case is somewhat different if we repeat the experiment on a different subject and get a different 
result. In that case we tend to partition the population into two groups, for each of which the TPT holds. 
For example the finding that men and women read with different parts of their brains is not permitted to 
upset  TPT. The problem is resolved simply by partitioning the human population into two groups by 
gender with respect to the P-discourse defined skill of reading.6 Thus we have men readers and women 
readers as two P-discourse categories each with their relevant but different brain mechanisms.
6 This point became clear to me during a discussion with Kevin Weinfurt
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Psychology as a Hybrid Science
Having  looked  at  three  ways  in  which  the  P-,  O-  and  M-grammars  can  be  bound  together  into  a 
comprehensive conceptual system fit to serve as the basis of a science, what kind of science will it be? 
Since doing psychology is a human activity, the same principles should apply it, as to any other pattern of 
action which realizes well established story-lines. If psychology is a cluster of narrations: what are the 
relevant grammars? It would surely be unacceptable to most psychologists to describe their professional 
activities in the O- and M-grammar. Only if  presented in the frame of the P-grammar could credit be 
claimed for a successful research project, since only in a frame in which the concept of "person" picks out 
the basic active particulars does the concept of responsibility have a place, and hence the concept of 
credit.
There  is,  in  a  sense,  only  one  stream of  action.  As  described  in  the  P-grammar  it  displays  such 
phenomena as  "emotions",  "attitudes",  "memories",  "items  of  knowledge",  "performance  of  athletic 
feats",  and so on.  Using the metaphor of  a stream we might  think of  these phenomena as eddies, 
whirlpools, froth and waves in the continuous flow that dries up only on the brain death of the actor. Some 
are ephemeral and others more enduring. 
It  seems that  the basic type-hierarchy that  has evolved in psychology in recent  years has two main 
branches, one material and one discursive. 
The first branch consists of the agents that produce material processes, in the environmental and in the 
bodies of organisms. The active entities are molecular clusters of a huge variety of types. For this branch 
we have recourse to a discourse-style shaped by the molecular grammar. The mode of action of M-
entities is causal and deterministic.
The  second branch consists  of  the agents  to  which we assign goal-seeking  capacities,  and for  our 
purposes the basic agents are predominantly whole organisms. For this branch we have recourse to the 
O- or organism grammar. The mode of action of O-entities is teleological, seeking practical goals, such as 
the bear who looks for homey.
The third branch consists the agents who produce discursive patterns, normatively constrained streams 
of meaningful actions, that in essence are the psychological practices of human beings, singly and in 
groups. The active beings are human beings as intentional agents, persons. For this branch we have 
recourse to the P- or person grammar. The mode of action of P-entities is intentional, that is by recourse 
to meanings and rules.
As  singular  sources  of  action  and  the  embodied  centers  of  perceptual  fields  people  are  centers  of 
discursive activity. But, according to this ontology, when considered in relation to discursive activities, 
people are not  psychologically complex. They produce complex private and public intentional and ever 
changing and evolving structures of discursive acts. Those that are private we are inclined to call mental, 
thoughts and feelings, but qua intentional acts they differ not at all from public acts, except in so far as the 
interactor whose uptake completes the action as act is, in the case of private acts, oneself. We produce 
our own minds, just as we produce conversations, tennis matches, orchestral performances, ditch digging 
and so on with others.
There are no hidden mechanisms in the P-domain, according to the point of view being developed here. 
The  program  of  Scientific  Realism  is  not  to  be  fulfilled  by  postulating  an  imperceptible  realm  of 
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unobservable mental mechanisms, as Freud did in introducing the unconscious mind. Scientific Realism 
in psychology is achieved by making use of the task/tool metaphor in proposing neural mechanisms as 
among the tools that people use for accomplishing their P-grammar tasks. The workings, but not the 
roles, of these tools are described and explained in the M- and O-grammars. Their domains are tightly 
woven together in that O-processes are routinely accounted for by recourse to hypotheses about hidden 
molecular processes. Since at least some M-processes are observable in principle, the proposal of a 
hidden  mechanism  explanation  can  often  lead  to  a  research  program  in  an  effort  to  verify  the 
verisimilitude of the working model of that mechanisms on which the hypothesis depends. 
Neither branch of the hybrid psychology can colonize the other. Human beings in the molecular ontology 
are  machines  with  no moral  attributes.  Brains in  the person  ontology are  tools  for  use  in  tasks  set 
discursively by people who are morally responsible for what they do with them. Giving priority to the P-
grammar preserves the outlines of human life as a moral world, while finding place for our brains as tools 
for morally constrained tasks. However, if we were to prioritize either O or the M grammar, people as a 
category disappear from the world of psychology, taking the moral universe with them. .
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